CAS Jurisdiction: Exhaustion of Internal Remedies
By Dr Estelle Ivanova, Attorney at Law, Paris, France
On 11 August 2026, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) issued its Award in the case of CAS 2025/A/11664 Kyriakos Stratouras v. World Taekwondo.
The case concerned an appeal against a decision of World Taekwondo (WT) (the Appealed Decision) dismissing a disciplinary complaint filed by Mr Kyriakos Stratouras (the Appellant), a taekwondo coach in Cyprus.
Background
On 9 April 2025, the Appellant filed a disciplinary complaint with WT under Article 3.3 of the WT Disciplinary Actions and Appeals Code (DAAC), alleging several infringements of WT rules by the Cyprus Taekwondo Federation (EOTK).
The allegations concerned, inter alia, the EOTK legal and sports recognition and governance; irregularities in its 2024 elections; the alleged exclusion of a minor athlete from competition in connection with the Appellant’s lack of access to the electronic tournament registration system; and alleged conflicts of interest involving tournament referees (para. 5).
On 22 July 2025, WT dismissed the Complaint under Articles 3.3(E) and 5.4(B)(i) DAAC “on jurisdictional grounds and on the basis that the issues raised are more appropriately addressed by domestic authorities”.
WT considered that these provisions gave it discretionary authority to decline complaints where the matter was better addressed by another competent authority or where there was an insufficient basis for WT to accept jurisdiction over domestic legal or administrative actions and exercised that authority to dismiss the Complaint. Importantly, WT stated that its decision was “final and not subject to appeal” (para. 15).
The Appellant appealed the WT decision directly to CAS.
CAS Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Internal Remedies
The principal issue before the Sole Arbitrator was whether the CAS could accept jurisdiction despite the Appellant’s failure to pursue an available internal appeal, where WT had expressly stated that its decision was not subject to appeal (para. 89).
The Sole Arbitrator first recalled that, pursuant to Article 186(1) of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law of 18 December 1987, an arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on its own jurisdiction. This principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is well established in CAS arbitration (paras. 81–82).
Turning now to the jurisdiction of CAS in the present case, the Sole Arbitrator referred to Article R47 of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration, under which an appeal against a decision of a federation or sports-related body may be filed with CAS where the relevant statutes or regulations so provide, or where the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement, and provided that the appellant has exhausted the legal remedies available prior to the appeal. In the absence of a specific arbitration agreement, the applicable international sports federation rules must, therefore, expressly recognise CAS jurisdiction, and all available internal legal remedies must first have been exhausted (para. 83).
The Sole Arbitrator further emphasised that the existence and scope of the relevant arbitration clause must be carefully examined, since sports federation rules may limit the right of appeal to CAS to specific types of disputes or decisions. Against this background, Article 4.12 DAAC provides that final decisions of a WT Appeal Panel may be appealed to CAS. The Sole Arbitrator considered, therefore, that “only final decisions made by a WT Appeal Panel may subsequently be appealed to the CAS” (paras. 84–87).
The procedural difficulty arose from the fact that the Appealed Decision expressly relied on both Article 3.3(E) DAAC, under which the WT decision whether or not to act upon a complaint is stated to be “unappealable” and Article 5.4(B)(i) DAAC concerning administrative closure for lack of jurisdiction. Decisions administratively closing a case are, pursuant to Article 5.4(E)(i) DAAC, subject to an internal appeal (paras. 88–90).
The Sole Arbitrator found that the Appealed Decision had erroneously stated that it was not susceptible to an internal appeal. Since the decision expressly relied on Article 5.4(B)(i) DAAC, it was subject to an appeal before the WT Appeal Panel under Article 5.4(E)(i) DAAC (paras. 88–90).
The Award nevertheless recognised that there “might be circumstances” in which jurisdictional provisions are ambiguous and an erroneous statement by an international sports federation, that its decision is not appealable, could “fundamentally mislead” a party, such that CAS might effectively dispense with the requirement to exhaust internal legal remedies (para. 91).
The Sole Arbitrator considered, however, that “this is not such a case”. In his view, the reference in the Appealed Decision to Article 5.4(B)(i) DAAC, read together with the applicable provisions of the DAAC, meant that “even a cursory look” at the decision and the relevant rules would have enabled the Appellant to determine that an internal appeal was available, notwithstanding the WT express statement to the contrary (para. 92).
Accordingly, the Appellant should have attempted to exercise his internal right of appeal. As he had not done so, the internal remedies available within WT had not been exhausted and there was no decision of the WT Appeal Panel capable of being reviewed by CAS. The Sole Arbitrator characterised this as “a fundamental flaw of the present Appeal” which he could not correct for the Appellant (para. 93).
CAS, therefore, declined jurisdiction. The same lack of jurisdiction constituted the basis for dismissing the Appellant’s three requests for provisional measures (para. 97).
Possibility of a Late Internal Appeal
The Award nevertheless addressed the possibility of a late internal appeal. WT had acknowledged that, although the ordinary 20-day time limit had expired, its erroneous statement that the decision was not appealable, together with the particular procedural circumstances of the case, might constitute “extraordinary circumstances” permitting a late appeal under Article 4.4(B) DAAC, subject to determination by the Juridical Committee (para. 98).
In the light of that position, the Sole Arbitrator “strongly encourage[d] WT to explore avenues to permit the Appellant to pursue an internal appeal within the WT framework “(para. 99).
Concluding Remarks
The Award reaffirms the importance of exhausting internal remedies before appealing to CAS. At the same time, it addresses the particular procedural difficulty arising where the decision under challenge itself erroneously states that no internal appeal is available.
Of particular interest is the Sole Arbitrator’s finding that “even a cursory look” at the Appealed Decision and the applicable rules would have enabled the Appellant to identify the available internal remedy, notwithstanding the WT express statement that its decision was “final and not subject to appeal” (para. 92).
In reaching that conclusion, the Sole Arbitrator emphasised that the Appealed Decision itself expressly referred to Article 5.4(B)(i) DAAC as part of its legal basis and that decisions issued under that provision were subject to an internal appeal within the WT framework (paras. 90–92).
The Award thus places emphasis on an appellant’s responsibility to verify the remedies available under the applicable international sports federation rules. It is noteworthy in this respect that WT’s own position as to the availability of an internal appeal evolved during the CAS proceedings. The Sole Arbitrator found that WT’s subsequent characterisation of the Appealed Decision as unappealable under Article 3.3(E) DAAC “unconvincing”, noting that the decision expressly relied on both Articles 3.3(E) and 5.4(B)(i) DAAC (para. 88). Since decisions issued under Article 5.4(B)(i) DAAC are “unambiguously” subject to an internal appeal under Article 5.4(E)(i) DAAC, the Sole Arbitrator considered that such an internal remedy was available to the Appellant (para. 90).
The Award also draws an important distinction between the consequences of erroneous appeal instructions for CAS jurisdiction and their possible consequences within the international sports federation internal appeal framework. Whilst the error was not considered sufficient in the circumstances to dispense with the requirement to exhaust internal remedies, WT itself acknowledged that the erroneous indication, together with the particular procedural circumstances of the case, might constitute “extraordinary circumstances” permitting a late internal appeal (para. 98). The Sole Arbitrator’s subsequent encouragement to WT to explore avenues allowing such an appeal, therefore, leaves open a possible internal procedural remedy, without altering the conclusion that CAS lacked jurisdiction over the appeal before it (para. 99).
The case thus illustrates the importance of clear and accurate appeal instructions by sports governing bodies, as well as the need for appellants to verify carefully the internal remedies available under the applicable rules, particularly where access to CAS depends upon their prior exhaustion.
Dr Estelle Ivanova may be contacted by e-mail at ‘
