RFC Seraing v FIFA: A Comment
By Dr Estelle Ivanova, Valloni Attorneys at Law, Zurich, Switzerland
It is with much anticipation that the international legal and sporting communities have awaited the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the case of RFC Seraing v FIFA (Case C-600/23) (see my previous Post on the SLT website), which was handed down on 1 August 2025.
The case posed the delicate question: to what extent can arbitral awards rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) be subject to review by national courts in the European Union (EU)?
The CJEU answer - framed, of course, within the logic and priorities of the EU legal order -was characteristically nuanced.
It confirmed that, whilst CAS awards remain legally binding, they may indeed be reviewed by EU Member State courts, but only where such awards touch upon matters of EU public policy.
The judgment thus preserves, at least in theory, the efficiency and uniformity that international sports arbitration provides, whilst gently reaffirming the primacy of EU foundational legal principles.
The question naturally arises: does EU competition law fall within this notion of public policy? The answer, in my opinion, is yes!
To understand why, one must look to the very heart of the European project. The EU commitment of ensuring fair and undistorted competition within its internal market is neither incidental nor peripheral, it is structural. Enshrined in Articles 101 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), EU competition law forms a legal architecture designed to safeguard the freedom of economic activity across Member States.
It is not merely about regulating markets; it is also about preserving the integrity of the single market itself. Whether by preventing collusive agreements, curbing abuses of dominant positions, or scrutinising mergers that reduce competition, these rules protect not only businesses, but also consumers and the broader economic fabric of the EU and underpin the four freedoms in the EU single market, enshrined in the EU Treaties: movement of goods, services, capital and people.
Moreover, the EU vigilant control of state aid ensures that public subsidies do not distort the playing field. This too is a central pillar of EU public policy. The European Commission, entrusted with enforcement, possesses wide investigatory powers and may impose meaningful penalties. These mechanisms ensure that the rules are not merely symbolic, but operationally effective.
Also, we should not forget the delicate interplay between EU and national competition law. Although supranational in nature, EU competition law does not exist in splendid isolation. It operates in close dialogue with domestic systems, underpinned by mechanisms of coordination and mutual recognition.
It is clear, therefore, that EU competition law is far more than a regulatory scheme; it is a cornerstone of the EU constitutional identity. And for that reason, it forms an integral part of EU public policy.
The International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS), the Governing Body of CAS, was quick to issue a Statement on the same day of the CJEU judgment, which reaffirmed the legitimacy of sports arbitration as a mechanism ensuring the consistent application of sporting rules, and emphasised that the CAS continued its commitment to providing “timely and expert dispute resolution worldwide.” The Statement also pointed out that only “on average, 6% of CAS decisions are appealed to the SFT [Swiss Federal Supreme Court] each year.”
However, the implications are undeniable: the once self-contained regime of final and binding CAS awards now finds itself drawn into the gravitational field of EU constitutional law.
The CJEU judgment in RFC Seraing draws a line between arbitral autonomy and judicial authority. The CAS, although seated in Lausanne, Switzerland, and revered in the sporting world, cannot stand apart from the EU legal order when its awards concern economic activity within the EU.
Although the CJEU judgment acknowledged the virtues of arbitration, its expertise, efficiency, and global reach, it also observed that, when recourse to arbitration is, in practice, unilaterally imposed, as is the case under the FIFA regulatory regime, the apparent voluntariness may be more fiction than fact. In such contexts, the right to effective judicial protection under EU law must remain a real guarantee.
To that end, the CJEU held that an arbitral award, which has not been subject to judicial review by a national court empowered to refer questions to the CJEU, cannot be granted the authority of res judicata within the EU, at least not when the award involves rules and principles belonging to the realm of public policy.
The implications are significant. The principle of res judicata, so vital to the finality and stability of arbitral awards, must now yield to the primacy of judicial review. Even the probative value of such awards vis-à-vis third parties must be withheld, unless and until compliance with EU public policy has been properly assessed.
At its core, the CJEU judgment in RFC Seraing affirms that the legal requirement to review compliance with EU public policy is not optional, nor contingent upon the procedural stance of the parties. It is a structural guarantee: one that exists to enable individuals concerned to exercise their rights to an effective remedy and to enjoy the level of judicial protection that must be ensured, where appropriate, even ex officio, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
And if national law - however long-standing - obstructs this duty, it must be disapplied. The CJEU judgment in RFC Seraing is unequivocal: the full effectiveness of EU law takes precedence, even over the cherished doctrines of res judicata and procedural autonomy.
The result is a legal landscape more fragmented, and perhaps less predictable, than before, and, in my view, the CJEU judgment carries with it the weight of unintended consequences, which are likely to be felt well beyond the confines of the Belgian and Swiss courts.
Dr Estelle Ivanova may be contacted by e-mail at ‘
